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1. Introduction 
During the recent years, a world-wide renewed interest in the exploitation of nuclear energy 
for electricity production is seen among both the Western and the new industrializing 
Countries (e.g., China and India). As a result, 61 reactors are now under construction and 
more than 100 units are planned for the incoming decade. Such impressive development is 
totally based on Light and Heavy Water Reactor (LWR & HWR) technologies [1], on designs 
that are an evolution of the robust and reliable Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) designed and 
built during the seventies-eighties of the last century. At that time, the need to guarantee an 
high safety level on one side and on the other the limited computational capabilities and the 
scarce knowledge of some phenomena, drove the main nuclear safety authorities to 
establish extremely conservative rules. Nowadays, after that tremendous progress has been 
made into the computational power availability, models accuracy and the knowledge of 
relevant phenomena, there is the need to go toward more realistic safety analyses and to 
relax some levels of conservativeness without compromising the always elevated safety 
level of the nuclear industry.  
The aim of this Chapter is to give an overview of the current trends in the licensing 
frameworks for a NPP. International best-practices are presented and discussed and sample 
applications derived from works of the San Piero a Grado Nuclear Research Group of the 
University of Pisa (GRNSPG/UNIPI) on existing industrial facilities are also reported. 
2. The licensing framework and the best international practices 
Three internationally recognized fundamental safety objectives [2] constitute the basis from 
which the requirements for minimizing the risks associated to NPPs shall be derived. A 
general nuclear safety objective is stated as “to protect individuals, society and the 
environment from harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations effective 
defenses against radiological hazards”. Two complementary safety objectives deal, 
respectively, with radiation protection and technical aspects. 
The established terms for the technical safety objective are: “to take all reasonably measures 
to prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate their consequences should they 
occur; to ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into 
account in the design of the installation, including those of very low probability, any 
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radiological consequences would be minor and below prescribed limits, and to ensure that 
likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely low”. 
In a recent publication of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [3] the safety 
objectives have been rephrased into one safety objective and ten safety principles. 
To demonstrate that all applicable safety requirements are fulfilled by the design and the 
operation of a nuclear power plant, a systematic evaluation must be conducted throughout 
the lifetime of the installation. According to well established safety practices [4], this 
systematic assessment should follow two complementary paths (or twofold strategy): a 
comprehensive safety analysis of the plant, and a thorough evaluation of engineering factors 
embedded in the design and operation of the installation. 
The comprehensive safety analysis shall address the dynamic response of the plant to a 
sufficiently broad spectrum of faults and accidents scenarios to demonstrate that states that 
could result in high radiation doses or radioactive releases are of very low probability of 
occurrence, and plant states with significant probability of occurrence have only minor or no 
potential radiological consequences. For performing plant safety analysis, methods of both 
deterministic and probabilistic analysis shall be applied [4]. 
The twofold safety assessment strategy shall be consolidated and documented in the so 
called Safety Analysis Report (SAR) which, according to recognized safety standard [5], 
must support the regulatory decision making process within the plant licensing framework. 
The requirements on SAR format and contents are dependent on country’s regulatory 
regime, although some consolidated practices have been widely followed [6], [7]. 
The achievement of a high level of safety should be demonstrated primarily in a deterministic 
way. The deterministic approach typically considers a limited number of events for which 
conservative rules for system availability and parameter values are often applied. 
Recently, with the development of code capabilities supported by experimental data basis, 
best estimate (BE) methods have also been applied within the design basis spectrum of 
events. In such situation, however, for licensing applications there is a need to address 
uncertainties in the calculations.  
For the deterministic BE analysis this kind of uncertainty (epistemic) results among others 
from imperfect knowledge of the physical phenomena or of values of code model parameters. 
Instead, aleatory uncertainty, resulting from inherent randomness or stochastic variability, is 
by its very nature the subject of Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) type of analysis. 
Any BE analysis considering uncertainties (in short Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty, BEPU) 
which is applied in the field of licensing should be consistent with [8] and [9]. More details 
on the international framework on BEPU analysis in licensing please could be found in [10] 
and [11]. 
3. The BEPU approach 
GRNSPG/UNIPI developed a procedure for the consistent application of BEPU in 
deterministic safety analysis (Fig. 1 shows a simplified flowchart), which has been applied 
in the licensing process of Atucha 2 NPP. The approach adheres to common practices of 
categorizing postulated initiating events (PIE) according to their frequency, and establishing 
more stringent acceptance criteria for more likely events. The following subsection provides 
an explanation on the terms, while the subsection after introduces a procedure for BEPU 
application.  
The procedure follows well accepted design philosophy for NPPs, which recognizes the 
principle that plant states which could result in high radiation doses or radioactive releases 
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are of very low probability of occurrence, and plant states with significant probability of 
occurrence have only minor or no radiological consequences. 
 
Phenomena 
consideration 
Most suited 
(BE) code 
Nodalization 
development 
Consideration of 
qualification: 
- Code 
- Nodalization
Scenario 
selection 
Performing the 
analysis 
Coupling with the 
SYS TH code
Uncertainty and 
sensitivity studies 
Criteria
Criteria & Acceptability 
Thresholds
Criteria
Uncertainty 
Quantification
?
Acceptability
RELEVANT 
PHEN
1 
3
4 5
6
8
9 
Analysis 
Safety Margins 
CIAU & BF 
method 
Computational
Platform 
RA 
SA 
AVAILABLE CODES , e.g. 
SYS-TH : Relap5/3D©, CFD : 
ANSYS-CFX-10.0, 3D NK : 
NESTLE, Lattice Physics : 
HELIOS….
CA 
RA
EM/Component 
Stress Analysis 
EM/Radiological 
Consequences 
CA 
Assumptions  
on BIC 
7
FSAR 
10
Select Accept. 
Criteria 
2 
11 
 
Fig. 1. General scheme of applying BEPU in accident analysis 
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3.1 The preliminary categorizing of events and acceptance criteria 
Before the scenario selection for the analysis, a preliminary categorization of the events 
leading to such scenario and the acceptance criteria for the evaluation of the safety margins 
have to be fixed. 
The event sequences postulated in the design of the plant are analyzed to demonstrate that 
in operational states, in and following a design basis accident and, to the extent practicable, 
on the occurrence of some selected accident conditions that are beyond the design basis 
accidents, the following three fundamental safety functions are performed: 
• Safe shutdown and long term subcriticality 
• Residual heat removal 
• Limitation of radioactive releases. 
PIE are grouped according to their anticipated probability of occurrence in anticipated 
operational occurrences (AOO), design basis accidents (DBA), beyond design basis accidents 
(BDBA) and severe accident (SA) (e.g., see Tab. 1). In the specific case of the Atucha-2 Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), an intermediate category or the selected beyond design basis 
accident (SBDBA) was introduced to address specific scenarios beyond design basis, 
including Double-Ended Guillotine Break (DEGB) Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) and 
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). Also in the Atucha-2 FSAR, the proposed 
BEPU analysis scheme was applied only to AOO, DBA and SBDA, while the remaining ones 
(BDBA and SA) were treated through the probabilistic safety analysis. 
 
Range of frequency 
(1/reactor-year) 
Characteri
stic 
Category 
Common 
Terminology 
Safety 
Consequences 
10-2 to 1 
(Expected in life of 
the plant) 
Expected AOO 
Anticipated 
transients, transients, 
frequent faults, 
incidents of 
moderated frequency 
No additional 
fuel damage 
10-4 to 10-2 
(Chance greater 
than 1% over the 
life of the plant) 
Possible DBA 
Infrequent incidents, 
infrequent faults, 
limiting faults, 
emergency conditions 
No 
radiological 
impact at all or 
no radiological 
impact outside 
exclusion area 
10-6 to 10-4 
(Chance less than 
1% over the life of 
the plant) 
Unlikely BDBA Faulted conditions 
Radiological 
consequences 
outside the 
exclusion area 
but within 
limits 
<10-6 
(Very unlikely to 
occur) 
Remote SA Faulted conditions 
Emergency 
response 
needed 
Table 1. Category of event based on its expected frequency of occurrence 
Acceptance criteria are applied in the deterministic safety analysis, following some rules and 
methods which have been developed to introduce conservatisms in plant safety evaluations. 
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Acceptance criteria are directly or indirectly related to the barriers against releases of 
radioactive material. Current adopted values and rules for using acceptance criteria have been 
developed considering some decoupling techniques that cover the range from plant processes 
to environmental impact. The decoupling should ensure that if, for example, the fuel safety 
criteria are fulfilled during the accident, then the radiological releases are limited and 
acceptable provided that the criteria for the two other barriers are also fulfilled.  
Safety criteria are mostly derived from the radiological reference values by applying several 
decoupling actions where, for some cases a phenomenon is substituted to the primitive one 
(decoupling phenomena), for some others, more restrictive values are imposed in order to 
be sure that the original requirement is satisfied (decoupling parameter). At each step, 
conservatisms are introduced that can be considered as margins for safety. Frequent events 
should have minor consequences and events that may result in severe consequences should 
be of very low probability. In this sense, the risk across the spectrum of AOO and DBA 
should be approximately constant. Acceptance criteria are derived for each category of event 
based on its expected frequency of occurrence, as shown in the Tab. 1 above. 
3.2 Grouping the events 
Generally, all selected scenarios are grouped in a classical families of events (around ten 
different families) where each family covers events with similar phenomena. 
For the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses, and for each category of events, the results of the 
analyses are assessed in terms of the fulfillment of safety functions which are graded 
according to the expected frequencies of occurrences for the correspondent PIE.  
To keep a consistently flat risk profile over the entire spectrum of AOO and DBA, the more 
frequent the event is, the less tolerable its consequences are. In this sense, acceptance criteria 
are selected for different event categories, for safety parameters as fuel and cladding 
temperatures, departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR), primary circuit pressure, 
containment pressures, and total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). 
3.3 Selection of the evaluation models & phenomena consideration 
The BEPU approach takes credit of the concept of evaluation model (EM, see below), and 
comprising three separate possible modules depending on the application purposes: 
• for the performance of safety system countermeasures (EM/SA); 
• for the evaluation of radiological consequences (EM/RA); 
• for the review of components structural design loadings (EM/CA). 
A fundamental step in performing safety analysis is the selection of the EM. With EM is 
generally intended the calculation framework for evaluating the behavior of the reactor 
system during Chapter 15 analyzed events. EM could include one or more codes, analytical 
models or also calculation procedure and all other information for use in the target 
application. 
To start analyzing typical events scenarios for the chapter 15 of an FSAR, EMs rely mostly 
on system thermal-hydraulic (SYS TH) codes (as for EM/SA) to solve the transport of fluid 
mass, momentum and energy throughout the reactor coolant systems. The extent and 
complexity of the physical modes needed to simulated plant behavior are strongly 
dependent of the reactor design and of the transient itself. 
For some scenarios, or regarding some analysis purposes, the SYS TH code may, for 
example, be complemented by (or coupled with) a three-dimensional neutron kinetics code 
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or the reference model may need an expansion to include a detailed simulation of controls 
and limitation systems which play a relevant role for determining the plant response. 
For the scope of the proposed approach for accident analyses, the complexity of the 
evaluation model may range from a simplified qualitative evaluation (EM/QA) to a 
complete combination of the three possible modules (EM/SA + EM/RA + EM/CA). 
The two main aspects which have been considered for developing the evaluation model 
with the ability of adequately predict plant response to postulated initiating events are 
intrinsic plant features and event-related phenomena characteristics. 
For the two modules EM/SA and EM/CA, the first set of requirements for the evaluation 
model is imposed by the design characteristics of the nuclear power plant, its systems and 
components. Requirements on the capability of simulating automatic systems are of 
particularly importance for AOO, in which control and limitation systems play a key role on 
the dynamic response of the plant. For evaluation of radiological consequences, the EM/RA 
module has demanded additional appropriate site-related features to be built in. 
The third set of requirements is derived from the expected evolution of the main plant 
process variables and the associated physical phenomena. For the proposed approach, this 
is performed through the process of identifying the Phenomenological Windows (PhW) and 
the Relevant Thermal-hydraulic Aspects (RTA). The relevant timeframe for the event is 
divided into well defined intervals when the behavior of relevant safety parameters is 
representative of the physical phenomena.  
3.4 Selection of boundary and initial conditions  
Additionally to the computers codes and the selection of modeling options, the established 
procedures for treating the input and output information are also recognized as comprising 
key parts of the evaluation model. The adopted procedures to select initial and boundary 
conditions (BIC), which follows the original design safety philosophy, are of particular 
importance for supporting the regulatory acceptability of the results provided by the EM.  
As the foreseen use of an EM is for licensing purposes, it is necessary to evaluate the 
suitability of conservative assumptions or to adopt BE approaches with the quantification of 
uncertainties. 
Suitability of conservatism should be understood as addressing the issue of “how 
conservative is conservative enough”. Alternatively, when a BE approach is adopted, then 
realistic assumptions will be input to BE models, conducting to realistic estimates for plant 
behavior. In these cases, licensing applications demand the quantification of uncertainties in 
the calculated results to ensure that safety margins are still available. For the scenarios were 
the conservative assumptions may provide enough safety margins, it can be derived by the 
analysts a criterion to determine the need for uncertainty calculations.  
Typically, SBDBA and some DBA can involve quantification of uncertainties.  
3.5 Selection of qualified tools 
For the adequate simulation of the identified phenomena (step “3” of Fig. 1), computational 
tools have to be selected from those which have previous qualification using an appropriate 
experimental data base. Satisfactory qualification targets provide basis for acceptability of 
the postulated application (see later). As referenced in Fig. 1 (step “4”), “computational 
tools” expression comprises: 
• BE computer codes 
www.intechopen.com
BEPU Approach in Licensing Framework, including 3D NK Applications   
 
203 
• qualified detailed nodalizations for the adopted codes 
• established computational methods for uncertainty quantification 
• computational platform for coupling and interfacing inputs and outputs of the selected 
codes 
In the GRNSPG/UNIPI approach, with the full scope of application of BEPU quantification, 
a pre-requisite is the availability or the support of the most advanced-qualified 
computational tools available on the market.  
Generally, for most event scenarios, the single purpose evaluation model EM/SA may be 
necessary and sufficient to be developed. In this sense, the availability and the application of 
qualified system thermal-hydraulic code and reliable uncertainty methodology (UM) is the 
minimum requirement.  
Additionally, depending on the specific event scenario and on the purpose of the analysis, it 
is necessary the availability of calculation methods that are not embedded in the SYS TH 
code, as, e.g. for burst temperature, burst strain and flow blockage calculations. This may 
imply an evaluation model EM/CA composed by a fuel rod thermal-mechanical computer 
code. Another example is in transients where strong asymmetric neutron flux changes 
happen; this could require the adoption of a three-dimensional (3D) neutron kinetics (NK) 
code (see later). 
3.6 Nodalization development & qualification  
Nodalizations (i.e., codes input decks and plant schematization) should be developed 
according to predefined qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria. Different methods 
and procedures are available, depending on the analyst choices and code types. 
Nevertheless, in a licensing process, it is fundamental to demonstrate to the Safety 
Authority the efficiency and the reliability of such qualification procedures. At 
GRNSPG/UNIPI, a suited set of criteria is proposed for SYS TH codes qualifications 
according to references [13] to [16]. 
A major issue in the use of mathematical models is constituted by the model capability to 
reproduce the plant or facility behaviour under steady-state and transient conditions. These 
aspects constitute two main checks for which acceptability criteria have to be defined and 
satisfied during the nodalization-qualification process. The first of them is related to the 
geometrical fidelity of the nodalization of the reference plant; the second one is related to 
the capability of the code nodalization to reproduce the expected transient scenario. A 
simplified scheme of a procedure for the qualification of a TH nodalization is depicted in 
Fig. 2. In the following, it has been assumed that the code has fulfilled the validation and 
qualification process and a “frozen” version of the code has been made available to the final 
user.  
3.7 Couplings, including the Neutronics 
As anticipated in Chapter 1.3.5, SYS TH codes have a leading role in the licensing analyses 
because of their capabilities to simulate with sufficient level of details the thermal-hydraulic 
phenomena of primary and secondary circuits of a LWR/HWR. In some specific transient 
analyses (that could belong to every category of the Tab. 1), it could be requested with a 
high level of detail the simulation of non-TH phenomena. In such cases, other BE codes have 
to be employed and coupled with robust and qualified procedures with the SYS-TH code 
18]. A typical example is when a detailed core power reconstruction is needed, both during   
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Fig. 2. Flow sheet of nodalization qualification procedure [17] 
steady-state and transients analyses. A chain of Neutronic codes has to be employed, 
[starting from the Evaluated Nuclear Data Files processing, passing through the neutron 
transport simulations (both in deterministic and stochastic ways), the few group 
homogenized cross section libraries calculations and ending in the 3D core-wide NK 
simulations (eventually coupled with a SYS TH code). An example of this sophisticated 
chain of BE codes is given in Fig. 3, and it was applied by the GRNSPG/UNIPI team for the 
licensing calculation of the Atucha-2 HWR, Argentina. In this case, needs of detailed 
neutronic analyses were due to the evaluation of the safety margins during a SBDBA (the 
DEGB LBLOCA). Because the positive void reactivity coefficient of the reactor, that transient 
was, at the same time, also a Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA). The peculiar characteristics 
of the reactor (e.g., oblique Control Rods and a second emergency scram system injecting 
boron solution in the full pressure moderator tank) requested the use of advanced Monte 
Carlo neutron transport simulations too.  
Needs for coupling different codes with SYS TH codes, could be necessary also in other 
technological fields, e.g. for the Pressurized Thermal Shock analyses (coupling Structural 
Mechanics, Computational Fluid Dynamics and TH codes), the Fuel Pin Mechanics analyses 
(coupling of Fuel Pin Mechanics, Neutronics and SYS TH codes) or the Containment 
analyses (coupling of Containment and SYS TH codes).  
Quality assurance of the coupling process as well as procedures for codes qualification has 
to be declared and demonstrated to the National Safety Authority. Example of procedure 
and validation campaigns of codes of different technological areas can be found in [19], [20], 
[21]. 
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Fig. 3. Example of BE Neutronic Chain of Code use for a set of Licensing Calculations 
3.8 Criteria for the application of uncertainty analyses 
In many cases, BE calculations on plant behaviour demonstrate a performance with no 
significant challenges to the applicable safety limits to such extent that, even adding the 
maximum expected uncertainty, acceptance criteria are fulfilled.  For this reason, the 
GRNSPG/UNIPI proposed BEPU approach derived a non-safety related criterion to decide 
upon the need for performing uncertainty calculation. Whenever the safety parameter, as 
calculated by the EM, comes within an established range or distance from the limit value, 
the uncertainty in the calculated results is quantified (BEPU application, see step “10” of Fig. 
1). The development of the non-safety related criterion, implies to establish the “range or 
distance from the limit value” for the plant safety parameters. The GRNSPG/UNIPI general 
adopted formula (except for DNBR) can be represented by: 
( )1MAX MAX ParCALC PAR Cat
PS
Par U Cr∗ + ≥  
where: 
- MAXCALCPar  is the maximum value of the calculated parameter for the transient-event 
under consideration; 
- MAXPAR
PS
U  is the maximum uncertainty value affecting the best estimate prediction of the 
parameter. The maximum uncertainty value is derived from the CIAU database 
considering the phase-space (PS) characterizing each event-category (AOO, DBA non-
LOCA, etc...). Therefore, the “range or distance from the limit value” is given by 
MAX MAX
CALC PAR
PS
Par U∗ . In some case, just the maximum value of the uncertainty for the 
whole phase space is considered ( MAXPARU ); 
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- ParCatCr  is the limit value for the selected parameter and event-category (AOO, DBA non-
LOCA, etc...) below of which no uncertainty analysis shall be performed. In some case, 
no distinction between event category is done ( ParCr ). Further information for each 
specific six non-safety related criteria can be found in [11]. 
4. The uncertainty quantifications  
For licensing applications, evaluation of uncertainty constitutes a necessary complement of 
BE calculations, which are performed to understand accident scenarios in water-cooled 
nuclear reactors. The needs come from the imperfection of computational tools, on the one 
side, and from the interest of using such a tool to get more precise evaluation of safety 
margins. Several uncertainties methods were developed since the development of the code 
scaling, applicability and uncertainty (CSAU) evaluation methodology  [22] by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e.g. see [23].  Hereafter, a brief description of the key 
features of the GRNSPG/UNIPI CIAU methodology for the uncertainty is given, together 
with some sample applications to different LWR. 
4.1 A method for the uncertainty quantification: the CIAU method 
The UMAE (Uncertainty Method based on the Accuracy Extrapolation) is the prototype 
method for the consideration of “the propagation of code output errors” approach for 
uncertainty evaluation. As described in section 3, the method focuses not on the evaluation 
of individual parameter uncertainties but on the propagation of errors from a suitable 
database calculating the final uncertainty by extrapolating the accuracy from relevant 
integral experiments to full scale NPP. 
Considering integral test facilities of reference water cooled reactor, and qualified computer 
codes based on advanced models, the method relies on code capability, qualified by 
application to facilities of increasing scale. Direct data extrapolation from small scale 
experiments to reactor scale is difficult due to the imperfect scaling criteria adopted in the 
design of each scaled down facility. So, only the accuracy (i.e. the difference between 
measured and calculated quantities) is extrapolated. Experimental and calculated data in 
differently scaled facilities are used to demonstrate that physical phenomena and code 
predictive capabilities of important phenomena do not change when increasing the 
dimensions of the facilities. 
Other basic assumptions are that phenomena and transient scenarios in larger scale facilities 
are close enough to plant conditions. The influence of user and nodalization upon the 
output uncertainty is minimized in the methodology. However, user and nodalization 
inadequacies affect the comparison between measured and calculated trends; the error due 
to this is considered in the extrapolation process and gives a contribution to the overall 
uncertainty. 
The method utilizes a database from similar tests and counterpart tests performed in 
integral test facilities that are representative of plant conditions. The quantification of code 
accuracy is carried out by using a procedure based on the Fast Fourier Transform 
characterizing the discrepancies between code calculations and experimental data in the 
frequency domain, and defining figures of merit for the accuracy of each calculation. 
Different requirements have to be fulfilled in order to extrapolate the accuracy [24]. 
Calculations of both Integral Test Facility experiments and NPP transients are used to attain 
uncertainty from accuracy. Nodalizations are set up and qualified against experimental data 
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by an iterative procedure, requiring that a reasonable level of accuracy is satisfied. Similar 
criteria are adopted in developing plant nodalization and in performing plant transient 
calculations. The demonstration of the similarity of the phenomena exhibited in test facilities 
and in plant calculations, accounting for scaling laws considerations, leads to the Analytical 
Simulation Model (ASM) or Evaluation Model, with a qualified nodalization of the NPP that  
The flow diagram of UMAE is given in Fig. 4. The bases of the methods and the conditions 
to be fulfilled for its application, including the use of the FFTBM can be found in references 
[25] and [26 to 29]. 
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Fig. 4.UMAE flow diagram (also adopted within the process of application of CIAU). 
All of the uncertainty evaluation methods are affected by two main limitations: 
• The resources needed for their application may be very demanding, ranging to up to 
several man-years; 
• The achieved results may be strongly method/user dependent. 
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The last item should be considered together with the code-user effect, widely studied in the 
past, e.g. reference [28], and may threaten the usefulness or the practical applicability of the 
results achieved by an uncertainty method. Therefore, the Internal Assessment of 
Uncertainty (IAU) was requested as the follow-up of an international conference jointly 
organized by OECD and U.S. NRC and held in Annapolis in 1996 [31]. The CIAU method 
[32] has been developed with the objective of reducing the above limitations. 
The basic idea of the CIAU can be summarized in two parts, as per Fig. 5: 
• Consideration of plant status: each status is characterized by the value of six relevant 
quantities (i.e. a hypercube) and by the value of the time since the transient start. 
• Association of an uncertainty to each plant status. 
In the case of a PWR the six quantities are: 1) the upper plenum pressure, 2) the primary 
loop mass inventory, 3) the steam generator pressure, 4) the cladding surface temperature at 
2/3 of core active length, 5) the core power, and 6) the steam generator down-comer 
collapsed liquid level. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Outline of the basic idea of the CIAU method. 
A hypercube and a time interval characterize a unique plant status to the aim of uncertainty 
evaluation. All plant statuses are characterized by a matrix of hypercubes and by a vector of 
time intervals. Let us define Y as a generic thermal-hydraulic code output plotted versus 
time. Each point of the curve is affected by a quantity uncertainty (Uq) and by a time 
uncertainty (Ut). Owing to the uncertainty, each point may take any value within the 
rectangle identified by the quantity and the time uncertainty. The value of uncertainty, 
corresponding to each edge of the rectangle, can be defined in probabilistic terms. This 
satisfies the requirement of a 95% probability level to be acceptable to the NRC staff [33] for 
comparison of best estimate predictions of postulated transients to the licensing limits in 10 
CFR (Code of Federal Regulation) Part 50. 
The idea at the basis of CIAU can be made more specific as follows: the uncertainty in code 
prediction is the same for each plant status. A Quantity Uncertainty Matrix (QUM) and a 
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Time Uncertainty Vector (TUV) can be set up including values of Uq and Ut derived by an 
uncertainty methodology, Fig. 6.  
At the moment the UMAE constitutes the ‘engine’ for the rotation of the CIAU shaft. The 
QAM and TAV, respectively Quantity Accuracy Matrix and Time Accuracy Vector in Fig. 6 
are derived from an UMAE like process and are the precursor of QUM and TUV. However, 
within the CIAU framework, any uncertainty method can be used to derive directly QUM 
and TUV.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Flow diagram at the basis of the CIAU methodology 
4.2 The CIAU qualification 
The UMAE and the CIAU have been used within the OECD/NEA/CSNI international 
projects UMS [23] and BEMUSE [34, 35 and 36]. The application of CIAU within the 
licensing process of Angra-2 PWR (a regulatory audit calculation, see later) [37 to 39] and 
the evaluation of safety of the Kozloduy-3 VVER-440 [40] can be recalled. Sensitivity studies 
and comparison with results from different uncertainty methods confirmed the qualification 
level of CIAU in those frameworks. Finally, different internationally available publications 
have been issued in relation to what is called external qualification process of CIAU, e.g. 
reference [41]. 
Time Accuracy
Vector (TAV) 
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4.3 Sample applications of CIAU 
Application of CIAU method to licensing analyses was performed by GRNSPG/UNIPI in 
various occasions, and last to the under-construction Atucha-2 NPP. Results of this work 
could not be included in this Chapter because at the time of writing the review process from 
the Safety Authority was still ongoing. Hereafter, there are shortly reported hereafter some 
other examples of CIAU applications produced in the last years. 
4.3.1 Uncertainty Analysis of the LBLOCA-DBA of the Angra-2 PWR NPP 
Angra-2 is a 4 loop 3765 MWth PWR designed by Siemens KWU. The NPP is owned and 
operated by the ETN utility in Brazil. The NPP design was ready in the ‘80s, while the 
operation start occurred in the year 2000 following about ten-year stop of the construction. 
The innovation proposed to the licensing process by the applicant consists in the use of a BE 
tool and methodology to demonstrate the compliance of the NPP safety performance with 
applicable acceptance criteria set forth in the Brazilian nuclear rule. 
The CIAU application was employed for performing an ‘independent’ BEPU analysis of the 
LBLOCA-DBA of the NPP. The analysis was classified as ‘independent’ in the sense that it 
was carried out by computational tools (code and uncertainty method) different from those 
utilized by the applicant utility. The main results are summarized in Fig. 7 and 8, where the 
PCT and the related uncertainty bands obtained through the CIAU and through the 
computational tools adopted by the applicant, are given. The following comments apply: 
- Continuous uncertainty bands have been obtained by CIAU related to rod surface 
temperature (Fig. 7), pressure and mass inventory in primary system. Only point values 
for PCT are considered in Fig. 8; 
- The CIAU (and the applicant) analysis has been carried out as BE analysis: however, 
current rules for such analysis might not be free of undue conservatism and the use of 
peak factors for linear power is the most visible example; 
- The conservatism included in the reference input deck constitutes the main reason for 
getting the ‘PCT licensing’ from the CIAU application above the acceptability limit of 
1200 °C; 
- The amplitude of the uncertainty bands is quite similar between the CIAU and the 
applicant. Discrepancies in the evaluation of the ‘PCT licensing’ outcome from the way 
of considering the ‘center’ of the uncertainty bands. In the case of CIAU, the ‘center’ of 
the uncertainty bands is represented by the phenomenological result for PCT obtained 
by the reference calculation (1100 °C in Fig. 7). In the case of applicant the ‘center’ of the 
uncertainty bands is a statistical value obtained from a process where the reference 
calculation has no role (796 °C in Fig. 8); 
- The reference BE PCT calculated by the applicant (result on the left of Fig. 8) plus the 
calculated uncertainty is lower than the allowed licensing limit of 1473 K; 
- The reference BE PCT calculated by CIAU (result on the right of Fig. 8) is higher than 
the PCT ‘proposed’ by the applicant and the upper limit for the rod surface temperature 
even overpasses the allowed licensing limit of 1473 K thus triggering licensing issues; 
- Based on the results at the previous point, new evidences from experimental data have 
been made available by the applicant. This allowed to repeat the BE reference calculation 
(both for the CIAU and the applicant). The new reference BE PCT calculated by CIAU is 
lower than the previous (about 200 °C) and close to the new reference PCT calculated by 
the applicant (‘base case’ in Fig. 7) and it is shown that the new CIAU upper limit for the 
rod surface temperature is lower than the allowed licensing limit of 1473 K. 
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Fig. 7. Uncertainty bands for realistic hot rod  
 
 
Fig. 8. Final result from the CIAU study and comparison with results of the applicant. 
4.3.2 BE and uncertainty evaluation of LBLOCA 500 mm for Kozloduy-3 
The analysis of the ‘LBLOCA 500 mm’ (DEGB in CL) transient [40] was carried out by 
adopting the Relap5 code. The specific purposes of the analysis included the assessment of 
the results and the execution of an independent safety analysis supported by uncertainty 
evaluation. A BE transient prediction of the ‘LBLOCA 500 mm’ was performed. Evaluation 
of the uncertainty was performed by CIAU for the RPV upper plenum pressure, the mass 
inventory in primary system and the hot rod cladding temperature. Only the last parameter 
is shown in Fig. 9 together with the uncertainty bands. The most relevant result is the 
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demonstration that the PCT in the concerned hot rod is below the licensing limit. In the 
same Fig. 9, bounding results (PCT and time of quenching) from two conservative 
calculations (i.e. obtained by a BE code utilizing conservative input assumptions) are given: 
one is the conservative calculation (‘driven’ conservatism in Fig. 9) performed by the 
applicant, the other is the conservative calculation performed by GRNSPG/UNIPI 
(‘rigorous’ conservatism in Fig. 9). The following can be noted: 
- The ‘driven’ conservative calculation has been performed by the applicant using a set of 
values for the selected conservative input parameters different respect to the values 
adopted in a previous analysis and accepted by the regulatory body; 
- The ‘driven’ conservative calculation is not “conservative” and does not bind entirely 
the BEPU upper bound. This implies that code uncertainties are not properly accounted 
for by the adopted conservative input parameter values; 
- The ‘rigorous’ conservative calculation performed by GRNSPG/UNIPI  is correctly 
conservative (i.e. it use the same set of values for the selected conservative input 
parameters previously licensed), but its conservatism is such to cause PCT above the 
licensing limit; 
- The comparison between the conservative PCT obtained by GRNSPG/UNIPI and the 
CIAU upper band of the BEPU calculation shows the importance of using a full BE 
approach with a suitable evaluation of the uncertainty. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Surface temperature at the PCT location in hot rod and uncertainty bands derived by 
CIAU application 
4.3.2 The BEMUSE project 
The last selected CIAU application constitutes a qualification study that at the same time 
allows a comparison with results of different uncertainty methods. Within the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) framework, two main activities 
related with the uncertainty evaluation have been performed (actually the second one is still 
in progress): the UMS [23] and the BEMUSE, [35], respectively. The objective of the BEMUSE 
project was to predict the LBLOCA performance of the LOFT experimental nuclear reactor 
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(i.e. test L2-5). The process included two steps: the derivation of a reference calculation, 
involving a detailed comparison between experimental and calculated data, and the 
derivation of uncertainty bands enveloping the reference calculation. The success of the 
application consisted in demonstrating that the uncertainty bands envelope the 
experimental data. Ten international groups participated to the activity. A sample result 
from the BEMUSE project is outlined in Fig. 10. 
The application of the CIAU was performed by the GRNSPG/UNIPI (dotted vertical line in 
Fig. 10) while all other participants used uncertainty methods based on the propagation of 
the input errors supplemented by the use of the Wilks formula. The consistency between the 
CIAU results and the experimental data can be observed as well as the spread of results 
obtained by the other uncertainty methods based on the propagation of the input errors. 
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Fig. 10. Uncertainty bounds from each participant ranked by increasing band width from 
left to right related to the  1st PCT’ of the LOFT experiment L2-5. 
5. Conclusions 
Massive and, at the same time, safe and reliable exploitation of nuclear energy constitutes a 
great challenge for the today world. Tremendous progresses were obtained during the last 
30 years in the field of nuclear reactor simulation thanks to an extended knowledge of 
several physical phenomena, to the code validation & assessment campaigns and to the 
impetuous advance of (cheap) computer technology.  
This chapter briefly presented the state-of-the-art in the licensing process for nuclear 
reactors, focusing on the potentialities and the advantages of the so-called BEPU approach. 
References to works and specific examples of the GRNSPG/UNIPI applications of such 
methodology to being-built or in operation nuclear power plants were also reported for 
giving a clearer idea of this sophisticated industrial process.   
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